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Abstract 
Human personhood and social benevolence – reformational 
reflections on the right to human dignity 
In spite of the academic interest in human rights in reforma-
tional-evangelical circles during the past 100 years, the exis-
tence, necessity and importance of such rights, in particular the 
right to human dignity, have not been provided with an under-
lying Scriptural foundation for the understanding and evaluation 
of these rights. In this article the reformational perspectives of 
Martin Luther are utilised and developed in order to establish a 
moral framework for the human right to dignity and for deter-
mining its meaning and purview as a foundational human, 
political and legal value. 
Opsomming 
Menslike personaliteit en sosiale welwillendheid – 
reformatoriese perspektiewe op die reg op menslike 
waardigheid 
Ten spyte van die akademiese belangstelling in menseregte in 
reformatories-evangeliese kringe die afgelope 100 jaar, is die 
bestaan, noodsaak en belang van sodanige regte, in besonder 
die reg op menslike waardigheid, nie van ’n onderliggende 
Skriftuurlike grondslag vir die verstaan en beoordeling van so-
danige regte voorsien nie. In hierdie artikel word die reforma-
toriese perspektiewe van Martin Luther aangewend en ont-
wikkel ten einde ’n morele raamwerk vir die mens se reg op 
waardigheid daar te stel asook vir die bepaling van die bete-
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kenis en omvang daarvan as ’n fundamentele menslike, poli-
tieke en juridiese waarde.  
1. Introduction 
In spite of the interest in human rights in evangelical circles over the 
past 100 years, the existence, necessity and importance of such 
rights have not been provided with an underlying Scriptural foun-
dation to facilitate the understanding and evaluation of these rights; 
nor has a sufficiently sound Christian motivation been provided for 
the scientific reflection on the essence of human rights and how they 
are activated, exercised and recognised in our daily living. Despite 
the absence of a sound evangelical edifice upon which to erect and 
develop the doctrine of human rights, the human instinct for the 
preservation of rights will not allow them to fall into oblivion. Despite 
neglect and abuse of rights, people know in practice and will insist 
that they are of supreme importance. The suspicions felt about signs 
of totalitarianism wherever it manifests itself, the growing feeling for 
the unshakeable personal value of the handicapped and the ailing, 
and even the preservation of the jury-system and its common-sense 
approach to things, are all signs that human rights are not forgotten 
among ordinary people. 
Johan van der Vyver, of Emory University, in Koers (2005:455-471), 
recently lamented the fact that a Scriptural foundation of human 
rights remains outstanding. Such a foundation is needed in view of 
the fact that wide disagreement exists on the issue as to whether 
human dignity could serve as the basis for human rights. Dis-
agreement on this issue, according to Van der Vyver, ranges from 
those perspectives where human dignity is not recognised as the 
basic norm of a bill of rights (e.g. in the USA), to the views pro-
pounding that all categories of human rights, namely the rights of the 
individual, civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural 
rights and solidarity rights, proceed from the notion of human dignity. 
For the purpose of this article the evangelical perspectives of Martin 
Luther are utilised in order to establish a moral framework for the 
human right to dignity as well as determining its meaning and pur-
view as a fundamental human, political and legal value.  
In early modern theologico-political thought Martin Luther presented 
the first comprehensive framework for critically evaluation of the 
moral duties of both political authorities and subjects in civil society. 
In this regard the moral views of ancient philosophers, like Cicero, 
influenced Luther’s theologico-moral perspectives in profound 
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respects. Firstly, to Luther, the political and legal duties and rights of 
both political rulers and subjects are grounded in the moral order of 
God’s creation – a moral order reflected in both the natural law 
inscribed on man’s conscience, and in the moral law contained in 
the Scriptures. The precepts of the natural moral law are, therefore, 
applicable to both governers and the governed in society. To Luther, 
temporal government is not a specifically Christian institution; 
government is an institution which God has provided for the benefit 
of all men – it exists like other institutions of the natural order in 
Christian and non-Christian societies. The order of the moral natural 
law provides a basis for identifying, developing and refining the 
fundamental rights underlying the legal order in civil society. 
Secondly, Luther applies the fundamental moral duty of all human 
beings to serve their fellow men with deeds of benevolent love as 
the basic criterion for distinguishing between moral good and moral 
evil in the legal sphere. Thirdly, because all rights have their origin in 
fundamental moral duties for protecting basic values, human beings 
are unavoidably attached to God’s supreme being and to other 
human beings (or “being” in general). Luther’s perspectives on being 
provide the framework for establishing the basis for equality and 
liberty as two fundamental values governing man’s political and legal 
obligations.  
The truth expressed in these views calls upon all evangelicals to 
persevere in their efforts to lay the foundations for studying and 
evaluating human rights in their true context – the light of Scripture 
and the moral value of being. From a wider evangelical context and 
the Ciceronian-medieval sources that informed the evangelical 
views of Martin Luther, this article focuses on the different values 
embodied in the concept of human dignity and the fact that it tends 
to be expressed in rather vague terms. Furthermore it is contended 
that the unspecified notion of human dignity is expressive of a 
number of fundamental values (or goods) central to man’s existence 
as a human person and indispensible for adding value to the nature 
of human beings in their relationships with God and their fellow 
human beings.  
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2. Human dignity is expressive of a number of 
fundamental values 
2.1 Human dignity as the value of moral personhood  
2.1.1 Human dignity as the value of moral equality 
In matters concerning the kingdom of creation, Luther acknowledges 
the value of the insights of ancient and medieval philosophers. 
Luther rejects Cicero’s emphasis on reason and the “absurdity” of 
his reliance on the doctrine of inexorable fate in the form of a series 
implexa causarum, and states that in the sphere of the kingdom of 
God and of grace Cicero has little to contribute in explaining the 
righteousness of God. However, Luther alludes positively to Cicero’s 
contributions in the field of moral duty.1 Luther ranks Cicero among 
the “philosophers of the better sort” (LW, 1:124 (LG); Genesis 2). He 
states that Cicero discusses religious issues concerning the origin of 
mankind with far greater discernment than does Aristotle (LW, 2:208 
(LG); Genesis 11)),2 and he often cites Cicero’s statement to the 
effect that “extreme justice is extreme injustice” (cf. e.g. LW, 2:337 
                                      
1 References to LW are to that of the American Edition of Luther’s Works (Luther, 
1958-1976). The specific work of Luther referred to, is reflected, e.g. Lectures 
on Genesis (LG), and the relevant Scriptural citation given where applicable. 
Abbreviations for Luther’s particular works used are: Lectures on Genesis (LG); 
Selected Psalms (SP); Notes on Ecclesiastes (NE); Theses concerning faith 
and law (F&L); Whether soldiers, too, can be saved (SS); Sermon on the Gos-
pel of St. John (SJ); Lectures on Galatians (LGS); Lectures on Deuteronomy 
(LD); Lectures on Romans (LR); Lectures on Titus, Philemon, and Hebrews 
(TP&H); The Catholic Epistles (CE); Church and ministery, 1 (C&M 1); Answer 
to Eck (AE); Concerning the ministery (CM); The Sermon on the Mount and the 
Magnificat (SM&M); Sermons (S); The Minor Prophets, 1 (MP1); Jonah and 
Habakkuk (J&H); Word and sacrament, 2 (W&S 2); Receiving both kinds in the 
sacrament (RS); Book of concord (BK). References to WA are to the standard 
edition of Luther’s Werke: kritische Gesamtausgabe; Weimarer Ausgabe 
(Luther, 1883-1987), WA Br. to the Weimarer Ausgabe, Briefwechsel. For 
Luther’s criticism of Cicero’s views on fate, cf. BK, 2.11.74. For examples of 
Luther’s rejection of the insights of the ancient philosphers in the matters of 
religion and grace, cf. LW, 2:314 (although Cicero did the best he could, yet he 
did not obtain grace); LW, 2:124 (LG, Genesis 8; Aristotle and Cicero teach 
many things about virtues – concerning God they teach nothing); LW, 4:54 (LG, 
Genesis 21; Plato, Cicero and Socrates are great men, but they are not the 
church – they do not have the promise); LW, 7:281 (LG, Genesis 42; Cicero did 
not know original sin); WA, 57:69 (14-16; because righteousness is faith in 
Jesus Christ (fides Jhesu Christi), Cicero’s views on justice and equity cannot 
explain the righteousness of God); also cf. Luther’s statements in his com-
mentary of Galatians (1519; WA, 2:503 (34-36)). 
2 This is a reference to Cicero, De natura deorum, 1.13). 
162   Koers 72(2) 2007:159-191 
Andries Raath 
(LG); Genesis 13); 2:358 (LG); Genesis 13); 13:150 n.12 (SP; Psalm 
101); 15:122 (25:223 (LR); Romans 3); 34:130 (F&L); 46:100 (SS)). 
The wisdom of ancient authors, like Cicero and the “fine old jurists”, 
was in effect preserved by God for the benefit of mankind, says 
Luther (LW, 13:199 (SP); Psalm 101). Therefore, the views of the 
ancients are most instructive, according to Luther, for gaining insight 
into matters pertaining to the kingdom of creation, for example moral 
duties, justice, and virtue.3  
Cicero uses the notion of human dignity to express the element of 
human personhood which features universally in all human beings. 
The common moral element shared by all human beings is 
expressed in terms of the idea of human dignity. Dignity accrues to 
all people. Justice, says Cicero, is closely attached to dignitas, for 
justice is a state of mind which preserves the common good by 
recognising the dignity of all men – only by respecting the dignity of 
all people in the state can justice be accomplished (Inv., 2.55.166).4 
Therefore, the common good is based on the respect for the dignity 
accruing to all human beings; and the harmony necessary for 
preserving a just political order in the “human alliance” can be 
achieved (cf. Inv., 2.55.166). To the extent that all human beings are 
endowed with dignity they are all equal in a moral sense. This does 
not mean, however, that all men are naturally equal: men are 
unequal because of their differences in office and standing. Cicero 
                                      
3 Also the Calvinist philosopher, H.G. Stoker, acknowledges the value of non-
Christian insights regarding the nature and role of legal norms and human rights 
in the jural sphere (cf. Stoker, 1970:46-49). It has to be noted that strong 
parallels exist between Luther’s ethical writings and Cicero’s De finibus 
bonorum et malorum. Similar to Cicero, Luther maintained that divine provi-
dence has appointed the world to be a common city for mankind, and each 
human being to be a part of this vast social system; that every human being has 
his own lot and place in life, and should take for his guidance the golden rules of 
obedience to God; knowing himself, and shunning excess. Parallel to Cicero’s 
“wise man”, Luther advances that Christian freedom, flowing from true wisdom, 
entails that one is free, though bound by chains; rich though in the midst of 
poverty; a king, for unlike the tyrants of the world, one is lord of himself; happy, 
for one has no need of waiting till the end of life, since a life virtuously spent is a 
perpetual happiness. An additional parallel exists between Cicero’s concept of 
virtue and that of Luther, and is contained in the notion of “half-conscious” 
principles of love and gratitude, inhering in every human being from his youth, 
and susceptible to cultivation and development, providing the foundation for 
incorporating the doctrine of natural law as a part of jural ethics. 
4 The following abbreviatiations are used for Cicero’s works cited in the text: Dom. 
(De domo sua); Fam. (Epistulae ad familiares); Inv. (De inventione (rhetorica); 
Part or. (De partitione oratoria); Phil. (Phillipicae); Leg. Agrar. (De Lege Agraria); 
Rep. (De re publica); Sest. (Pro Sestio). 
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also applies the term dignity to persons of unequal social position, 
human status or honour, because of leaders in the state and 
because of the value of their office for promoting the good of the 
citizenry in society. Dignitas in this sense is used to indicate a 
distinguished office which merits respect, honour and reverence 
(Inv., 2.55.2). In managing the unequal positions of persons in the 
society, the government of a state should maintain and promote 
“peace with dignity”, which Cicero describes as the most outstanding 
and desirable purpose of all good and happy people. “Peace with 
dignity” is above all peace with honour in both the state and in one’s 
own life. Dignitas in this sense represents a virtue linked to law (cf. 
Dom., 9.23; 50.130; Part or., 8.28; Phil., 8.3.10; Sest., 46.98, and 
Inv., 2.54.166). In this context dignity bears the primary meaning of 
worthiness, merit or desert, thereby indicating that each person 
should be granted what he deserves in terms of distributing justice, 
according to which end every person should receive his due.5
Cicero’s moral theory impacted strongly on the early Christian and 
medieval Christian traditions. Also St. Augustine’s use of the term 
dignitas includes references to the differences in status, position and 
rank of human beings in the civitas terenae. This is reflected in his 
message to the Christian teacher, pointing out the dignity and 
responsibility of the office he holds (Augustine, 1997: Dei civitate Dei 
(DCD), Bk. 4, Ch. 18 ff.). The use of dignitas in this sense runs 
parallel to Cicero’s application of the term. Thomas Aquinas shows 
how the word “person”, originally meaning a mask used by actors in 
the theatre, came to mean human beings constituted in dignity. 
Because actors played the parts of famous people in comedies and 
tragedies, the word “person” was applied to those who had this 
dignity. And, says Aquinas, because subsisting as a reasoning 
nature is a great dignity, every individual of reasoning nature is 
called a “person” (Summa Theologica, P(1) Q(29) A(3)6). In 
Aquinas’s scholastic philosophy the universal nature of man is linked 
to rational nature – every individual of rational nature is called a 
person. Person is a “hypostasis” distinguished by a proper dignity 
existing in man’s rational nature. Therefore dignity is something 
absolute and pertains to man’s essence. On the other hand, 
Aquinas also alludes to the inequality of human beings in spite of 
their being equal in a moral sense – because it belongs to God’s 
                                      
5 Suum cuique tribuere (tribuens) or suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. 
6 Summa Theologica, First Part, Question #29, Argument 3. 
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kingly dignity to have humans as his “co-adjutors”, not because 
there is any defect in God, but because He employs intermediary 
causes in order that beauty may be preserved in the universe, and 
also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality, 
He clothes humans with dignity to combat sin and to maintain 
distributive justice in society.  
The evangelical views on human personhood introduced by Luther 
establish a closer link between the individualistic and universalistic 
approaches to the idea of society. To Luther the relationships of 
human persons inter se provide the highest value of society. 
Through neighbourly love human beings must strive towards accom-
plishing God’s aim with mankind. Neighbourly love must constantly 
be renewed by man’s consciousness of the relationship with God. It 
means that the effects of love become manifested by being con-
stantly renewed through man’s love and glorification of God. What 
are the implications of this view for human personhood? Firstly, it 
entails the moral equality of all human persons before God in spite 
of differences in wealth, status and position. Secondly, all men are 
endowed with duties and responsibilities which they cannot shun or 
devolve on others. Thirdly, freedom of conscience and the right of 
personal conviction is something inviolable and which can be de-
fended against church, state and society. Fourthly, all human beings 
have their callings (as God-given obligations) to be performed for 
the common good.  
From Luther’s evangelical perspective, dignity is actually reflective of 
the glory of God, because every human being and every institution 
should be pleasing to God and should reflect the glory of God (LW, 
4:289 (LG); Genesis 24). In God’s creational order everything has its 
purposeful role – so for example each sex was clothed by God with 
its own uprighteousness and dignity (LW, 9:219 (LD); Deuteronomy 
22) and the original value and importance of marriage envisaged by 
God is similarly expressed in terms of dignity (LW, 5:188 (LG); 
Genesis 28). The glory of God is reflected firstly in all man’s 
relationships to God and towards his neighbour. Human dignity is 
primarily a spiritual matter discernable through faith and the work of 
the Spirit. Therefore, the world rates it a much higher honour and 
privilege to be the son and heir of a prince, a king, or a count than 
the possessor of God’s spiritual goods, although by comparison all 
of these are nothing “but poor bags of worms” and their glory “sheer 
stench” (LW, 22:28 (LJ); John 1). Just compare all this with the 
“ineffable dignity” and nobility of which the evangelist speaks: “To all 
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who received Him,” that is believed in his name, “They have power 
to become children of God” (LW, 22:88 (LJ); John 1).  
If we really believed with all our heart, says Luther, firmly and 
unflinchingly, that the eternal God, Creator, and Ruler of the world, 
is our Father, with whom we have an everlasting abode as children 
and heirs, not of this transitory wicked world but of all God’s 
imperishable, heavenly and inexpressible treasures, then we would 
indeed, concern ourselves but little with all that the world prizes so 
highly, much less would we covet it and strive after it. Indeed, we 
would regard the world’s riches, treasures, glories, splendour, and 
might – compared with the dignity and honour due us as the children 
and heirs, not of a mortal emperor but of the eternal and almighty 
God – as “trifling, paltry, vile, leprous, yes as stinking fish and 
poison”. For this glory, no matter how great and magnificent it may 
be, is in the end, consumed by “maggots and snakes in the grave” 
(LW, 22:88 (SJ); John 1). Dignity should always be determined by 
looking at the Word and not at the work, “and weighs and estimates 
the dignity of the work on the basis of the Word, where even if the 
work is the lowliest of all, yet this prudence values it as most 
precious, for he always puts the highest value on the Word” (LW, 
25:408 (LR); Romans 10). The value of Christian sacrifice consists 
in prayer – in the evening in the “killing of reason,” and in the 
morning the glorification of God. No one can adequately proclaim 
the value and dignity of Christian sacrifice (LW, 26:233 (LGS); 
Galatians 3). 
From an evangelical perspective Luther posits the moral liberty and 
equality of all human beings. Firstly all human beings reflect moral 
equality and liberty related to human personhood of all human 
beings – in the kingdom of God all men are equal in their being 
human persons because God does not regard the person (LW, 4:32 
(LG); Genesis 21). He cites a number of examples reflecting God 
not regarding the person’s position, status or money: no person can 
please God except through the circumcision of the heart (LW, 9:110 
(LD); Deuteronomy 10); God does not consider personal status by 
judging for the widow and the orphan (LW, 9:113; Deuteronomy 10); 
by making the shepherd boy David such a blessed king, while letting 
Saul become an unhappy and frustrated man, God shows that He 
selects without discrimination (LW, 13:214 (SP); Psalm 101); 
mankind is one dough, one person is like the other, with which God 
does as He pleases (LW, 13:214 (SP); Psalm 101); the example of 
God’s sincere, honest and authentic love should be followed, so that 
there is no discrimination between persons (LW, 29:53 (TP&H); 
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Titus 2), and although the gifts of God are manifold and different, no 
one is higher than the other before God – therefore everyone, even 
the highest, should humble himself and honour his neighbour (LW, 
30:79 (CE); 1 Peter 2). In a fundamental sense, dignity pertains to 
man’s godly and kind acts.7 Therefore through humility we lose 
nothing at all of our dignity, even though we accommodate 
ourselves to the well-being of others and indeed to the glory of God 
(LW, 6:163 (LG); Genesis 33). Christ set the perfect example by not 
being impressed by the great honours, their wordly dignity and their 
splendour.8 He even chides them and calls them fools and 
deceivers (LW, 23:254 (SJ); John 7). Praying to God in the name of 
Christ provides a prayer with the good quality and the dignity that 
make it acceptable to God (LW, 24:392 (SJ); John 16).  
In spite of the fact that all men are equal in moral value before God,9 
He distributes his gifts unequally between persons.10 So, for 
example, there are great differences between people regarding 
status and office (LW, 3:65 (LG); Genesis 16); every person has his 
own calling and gifts (LW, 3:129 (LG); Genesis 17); people differ 
                                      
7 This is because “dignity” has to be understood in relation to the Word, faith and 
the working of the Spirit in man’s life (cf. LW, 39:161 (CM 1, AE); 40:23 (C&M 2, 
CM)). In a spiritual sense the “lofty dignity” of the Christian cannot be 
comprehended – by virtue of his “royal power” he rules over all things, death, 
life, and sin, and through his priestly glory is omnipotent with God, because he 
does the things which God asks and desires (LW, 31:355). 
8 Luther follows the view of Augustine, admonishing us not to revel in the dignity 
of rich parents but in the company of poor brethren (Regula Augustini, ch. 5, 
Patrologia, Series latina, XXXII, 1379). 
9 It also means that all human beings are equal before the moral law. In this 
sense it can be said that there is a “natural” moral equality between all men, in 
that all are generically human beings. All have a moral, responsible and 
immortal destiny, and are inalienably entitled to pursue it. All are morally related 
alike to God, the common Father; and all have equitable title to the protection of 
the laws under which divine providence places them. As such, all men, ruler and 
subject, are “equal before the law”, protecting the persons and rights of both. 
Both, as humans and as subjects of human society, have the same generic 
moral right to be protected in their several (different) callings and estates of life. 
10 The very essence of society posits an element of equality between the 
associate members. However, although the bond of society is based on 
equality, society contains an element of inequality, e.g. there is inequality in 
authority between political rulers and subjects. Just as social freedom does not 
destroy the obligations of the members of society, social equality does not 
prevent the presence of accidental differences among them. On the other hand, 
all members of society have social freedom and equality before the law in 
attaining moral virtue. 
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with respect to wealth, abilities and merit and therefore everyone 
should remain in his calling and live content with his gifts (LW, 3:129 
(LG); Genesis 17).11 To enforce the principle of arithmetic 
proportion in the kingdom of the world, would bring about anarchy 
and destroy order; hence geometric proportion must be applied in 
the affairs of government and civil society (LW, 3:130 (LG); Genesis 
17). Arithmetic proportion is applied in the kingdom of God, where it 
is proper for all things to be equally distributed among unequals, “for 
the eyes and the feet, inasmuch as they are members of one body, 
to bear the same and equal burdens” (LW, 3:130 (LG); Genesis 17).  
Luther’s application of the Aristotelian distinction between arith-
metical and geometrical equality in the kingdom of God and the 
world respectively, entails that because persons are not the same, 
“for all are not equally strong”, the principle of geometric proportion 
should apply because it “does not compare one thing with another, 
as is customarily done in the market place; but it compares the 
persons and arranges the matter according to them” (LW, 5:308 
(LG); Genesis 29). The application of the principle of geometric 
equality in the kingdom of the world entails that the differences 
between persons must be considered, and then one must assign to 
each one his place and distribute the burdens accordingly: firstly, the 
differences in the person must be observed; secondly, the duties 
                                      
11 Luther maintains the distinction between the person and the offices distributed 
by God – we are all born equal and all alike; once we are born, God adorns and 
dresses us up by making one a prince and the other a citizen (cf. LW, 21:22 
(SM&M); Matthew 5). God does not belittle physical birth and position in life, He 
preserves each with all its due dignity in the world. He commands that children 
honour their parents, though the latter may be poor beggars, that subjects obey 
the government, and also that parents and government use their office for the 
welfare and good of children and subjects and administer their office well (LW, 
22:96 (SJ); John 1). On the other hand power is needed for persons in office to 
perform their duties. Therefore, says Luther, it is a “fictitious doctrine” to 
separate power from office (LW, 40:23 (C&M 2); Baptism). However, people 
should not revel in their offices and positions because God distributes these 
gifts for man to be humble and to serve his neighbour with them. If people 
receive the gifts of office from God, thereby being more powerful, higher, more 
learned, nobler than others, they should remember that God commanded them 
to take these gifts and serve their neighbours with them. If they do not, then they 
should know that even a poor shepherd boy, who compared to them has no gifts 
or standing whatsoever in the world, is far greater and closer to heaven in the 
sight of God and the angels. They, however, with their fine, high dignity and 
their “trappings”, will be cast into hell (LW, 51:351 ff. S 1; Sermon at the 
Dedication of the Castle Church in Torgau, Luke 14:1-11, October 5, 1544). For 
the principle that all persons are equal in moral worth before God and in serving 
one another to the welfare of the community, cf. Raath (2004: 25-55, 30-31). 
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and/or the station of each person should be considered (LW, 8:173 
(LG); Genesis 48). Geometric proportion reflects the grace which 
should have a place in the government, in civil society and in the 
household (LW, 8:173 (LG); Genesis 48); it provides government 
with a “middle course” to attain justice “(f)or virtue is a quality that 
resolves about a middle course, as a wise man will determine” (LW, 
8:174 (LG); Genesis 48).  
Luther expresses the test for accomplishing justice in the world, 
according to the principle of geometric proportion, as follows: to 
render to each what is his own; to bother no one; and on the other 
hand, to help others, to promote their welfare, to prevent damage 
and violence, so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent 
protected by restraining the wicked and protecting the good, in order 
for the state to be in a good condition and so that each person may 
in peace enjoy what is his own (LW, 18:260 (MP 1: H-M); Micah 6).  
The supreme duty among human persons to foster, practise and 
promote benevolence as contained in the twofold commandment of 
love expressed in the precept to love your neighbour as yourself and 
the demand to treat your neighbour as you would like to be treated, 
is the foundation for the just and peaceful ordering of society.12 The 
Decalogue not only apprises us of our lawful obligations towards 
others, but we also need to discern how far the Holy Spirit has 
advanced us in his work of sanctification and how much we still fall 
short of the goal (LW, 41:166 (CC)). At the juncture of man’s 
callings, duties and responsibilities on the one hand, and the virtues 
of love, justice and peace on the other, the fundamental rights of 
                                      
12 In so far as neighbourly love is concerned, all persons are equal, irrespective of 
the offices or the different roles they may have in the various estates (LW, 
21:214f. (SM& M); Matthew 7:3). Because of the equality in calling between all 
people, everyone should remain in his calling and do his duty properly and 
faithfully (LW, 22:214 (SJ); John 2). Every person should know that his work, 
regardless of the station of life in which he is, is a divine work, because it is the 
work of a divine calling and has the command of God (LW, 27:3 ff. (LGS); 
Galatians 1). Therefore all people are equal in their being called by God (BK 
(AAC), 1.10.11). The commandments of God should not be interpreted to mean 
nothing else than to wish someone well, or that love is a quality inhering in the 
mind by which a person elicits the motivation in his heart. “This is a completely 
bare, meager, and mathematical love, which does not become incarnate, so to 
speak, and does not go to work. By contrast, Paul says that love should be a 
servant, and that unless it is in the position of a servant, it is not love” (LW, 
27:51 (LGS); Galatians 1). 
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man come into play.13 The divine ordinances inscribed on man’s 
conscience give rise to fundamental rights for man to fulfil his calling 
and duty towards God and to live in peace with his fellowman in the 
promotion of justice in society (cf. Witte, 2002:302). In his com-
mentary on Habakkuk 1:7,14 on the other hand, Luther points out 
that if the purposes for which God instituted his creational institu-
tions is substituted for man’s evil ends, God’s judgment will be 
exacted over man’s abuse of God’s gifts (LW, 19:112 (MP 2, J&H); 
Habakkuk 1).15
The complexities pertaining to the principle of moral equality, 
demand illucidation: Firstly, the fact that political authorities have the 
duty to protect the rights of all in civil society equally, should not be 
confused with the inequalities pertaining to social obligation. The 
person who faithfully fulfils his obligations cannot be classed 
together with the person who does not; neither can the person who 
respects the effects to do good with those who do not. Virtue and 
love should be permitted to produce social inequalities of good and 
evil among human beings. Therefore the doctrine of the equality of 
good, understood in its material sense, is false and reprehensible; 
                                      
13 Rights and duties are correlative and only pertain to human personhood. Love 
of the person constitutes the moral bond; it is the soul of morality; yet it is the 
source of right and good. 
14 “Their justice and dignity proceed from themselves.” 
15 “You have neglected justice, you have changed the Law as you pleased, you 
have not rendered equal justice but have done all things with violence. 
Therefore, because you have been unwilling to judge fairly, a judge will come 
against you eventually who will teach you how to judge. His justice and dignity 
will proceed from himself. Since you do not follow righteousness, therefore the 
justice and dignity of the Chaldeans will come upon you, so that the truth of the 
jingle will mock you: ‘If you do not wish to judge, you will be judged by him.’” 
Luther refers to specific instances of man’s existence in the state of innocence 
as a state of “original and true dignity”: the human body in the state of 
innocence reflected the greatest dignity because it answered its real calling and 
was used for the true purpose God intended it for, namely the glorification of 
God (LW, 1:141 (Lectures Genesis, Genesis 3)); the results of sin were among 
others, that the human will lost its original dignity of being “good” and 
“righteous”, pleasing God, obeying God, trusting in the Creator, by becoming 
depraved, making a devil out of God and “shuddering at the mentioning of His 
name” (LW, 1:141 (Lectures Genesis, Genesis 3)); also marriage of man and 
woman lost its dignity by losing its divinely ordained purpose, because man’s 
flesh is kindled with passion, so that after sin, the marriage union does not take 
place in public like a work of God, “but respectable married people look for 
solitary places far away from the eyes of men” (LW, 1:141 (Lectures Genesis, 
Genesis 3)). 
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and equally false is the notion that governmental wisdom must tend 
to this equality as to its end.  
Secondly, from Luther’s evangelical point of view, person could be 
defined as the human subject endorsed with moral personality. 
Personhood is the most important element of human nature and it 
provides the form of rights. Morality consists in a relationship of the 
will with the moral law, therefore there is a difference between what 
is personal and what is moral. That which is moral concerns only the 
relationship of the will with the moral law; whereas that which is 
personal includes the concept of the supremacy of love. Person is a 
subject in so far as it is subject to and guided by love towards God 
and one’s neighbour. Person can be defined as a moral subject, a 
substantial moral individual, subject to the supreme, active principle 
of love. For love to be virtuous, benevolence must be practiced 
according to the moral law.  
Thirdly, in the human being moral subjectivity and person are the 
same thing. The moral principle which does not differ from the 
volitive principle is that which is supreme and most excellent in 
human nature. In the human being, the principle which is the highest 
point of existence is, properly speaking, the moral subjectivity rather 
than the rational faculty as held by Aquinas. Moral good and evil are 
present whenever the will is properly or evilly disposed, relative to 
the moral law. By acting morally the human being unites himself to 
all beings and to the divine Being, as the source of all being, loving 
them all and receiving love from them all. The noblest end of the 
human person is the communication with, attachment to, and mutual 
society with human beings and between them with the divine Being 
– the End of creation.  
Fourthly, although different classes of human beings in civil society 
may enjoy different grades of privilege and function, according to 
their different natural abilities, the inferior is shielded in his rights by 
the same relation to the common heavenly Father, by the same 
golden rule of benevolence and of the equitable right which shields 
the superior in the enjoyment of his larger powers. Although the 
functions and callings of rulers and subjects may differ, the same 
moral law protects them both in their rights, and commands them 
both in their respective duties. This principle establishes between all 
men a moral, but not a mechanical, equality. Both higher and lower 
hold the same relation to the Supreme Ruler and Ordainer of civil 
life, God; yet they hold different relations to each other in society, 
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corresponding to their differing capacities and fitnesses, which 
equity demands.16 Therefore, although the relation of superior and 
inferior with their unequal powers and abilities is asserted, in the 
same breath the equal moral obligation of both as bearing the 
common relation to one divine maker and judge is maintained.17  
2.1.2 Human dignity as the value of moral liberty 
Cicero made an important contribution to the philosophical 
reflections on the value of moral liberty by introducing the view that 
the liberty to answer one’s calling and perform one’s moral duties in 
society are important prerequisites for establishing peace and justice 
in civil society. This liberty is based on the moral equality of all 
people in civil society. If this liberty is not the same for all, says 
Cicero through  Scipio, it does not merit the name of liberty. Such 
liberty is subject to the moral duties attaining to all persons – if the 
people retain their rights in liberty, no form of government would 
enjoy greater eminence, liberty or happiness. Such a society would 
have the same interest, since discord arises from conflicting 
interests, where different circumstances afford varying benefits and 
advantages to different people. Since law (lex) constitutes the bond 
binding together society, and the rights (ius) of liberty arising from 
such law are equal, citizens would have equal legal status. Although 
people may be unequal in wealth and talents, the rights of citizens in 
civil society should be equal, since the state (civitas) is an 
association of people with equal rights (iuris societas) subject to law 
(Rep., 1.32.48, 49). A similar perspective on the equality of moral 
liberty as the basis for equal rights and legal status is found in 
Grotius’s use of the term jus, in the sense of a moral equality of the 
person enabling [competens] him to have or to do something justly. 
The phrase moral equality, to Grotius, could be either “perfect” in the 
sense of facultas, or “imperfect”, in which instance it is called 
aptitudo. The Roman jurists’ alluding to the jus suum cuique tribuere 
has a bearing on facultas (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1.1.3).  
Thomas Aquinas, from a scholastic perspective, added to the 
philosophy of liberty and the analysis of the legal impact of moral 
                                      
16 Cf. Job 31:13, 14, 15; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1. 
17 This does not imply that all men are also held to be mechanically and naturally 
equal in physical and mental abilities. From this perspective it may also be 
stated that equality in the moral sense serves as the foundation of just freedom 
and opposes the heresy of thought which holds that equality must be 
“mechanical” as well as moral for society to be naturally just. 
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liberty by stating that freedom of choice provides the matrix in which 
human responsibility for good exists. Reflecting on human action 
and morality, Thomas Aquinas states that man is made in the image 
of God, and that this implies, as St. John of Damascus said, that 
man is intelligent and free in judgment and master of himself. So, 
having considered both the exemplar of that image, namely God, 
and the things that proceed by divine power and the will of God, it 
remains for man now to consider the image itself, namely man, 
precisely insofar as he is the source of his own actions and has 
freedom of judgment and power over his own works and deeds 
(Aquinas, 1997:1-2, Prologue).  
In the evangelical fold, Luther incorporates the views of earlier philo-
sophers in his evangelical perspectives on the moral value of liberty 
into his Scriptural approach in the quest for establishing justice in 
society. The moral liberty of man is intricately attached to the 
spiritual liberty established by God’s spiritual law of love and the 
submission of man’s will to the will of God (WA, 3:621 (13)).18 
Through the work of God’s Spirit man’s liberty is a liberty of love by 
submitting oneself to God’s Law (WA, 1:437 (27)).19 God’s will, 
expressed in natural law20 and God’s moral law, is a law of spiritual 
freedom. Luther calls it the lex libertatis – it disseminates a spirit of 
liberty in relation to both God and one’s neighbour (cf. WA, 2:500 
(24)).21 God’s law of liberty moves man to submission and obe-
dience of divine law (WA, 39 (1):203 (20).22 It liberates man from 
egoistic self-love and humbles man to serve his neighbour in love 
(WA, 56:481 (23)).23  
                                      
18 “Pater per filium iudicat …, quinque conformis ei repertus fuerit, ad eum additur. 
Qui autem difformis, seperabitur.” 
19 “Omnia mandata requirunt charitatem, cum sine charitate id est, facili, prompta, 
hilari, libente voluntate, si implentur, non implentur.” 
20 Cf. Raath (2005:425-454). 
21 “Nullum bonum opus [fit] nisi hilari, volente, gaudenteque corde fiat, id est in 
spiritu libertatis.” 
22 “Nulla [est] lex, sed res ipsa, quam lex in hac vita requirit.” 
23 “Cum liber esset, omnium se servum fecit. Que servitus est summa libertas, 
quia nullius eget, non accipit, Sed dat er exhibet. Ideo est vere libertas et 
propria Christianorum”, and WA (5:38.27): “Libertas Iusticiae Christianae … 
Beatus hic vir [ps. 1:1 vulg.] liber in omne tempus, in omne opus, in omnem 
locum, in omnem personam.”; 39.4: “Omnibus ubique per omnia servit.” 
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To Luther freedom of conscience is preceded by the conscience of 
freedom as a result of the justification based on faith and the 
breaking of the bonds of conscience ensnared by evil through 
hearing the gospel and promoting love according to the will of God 
(LW, 36:250, 255 ff. (W&S 2, BKS)). It brings about spiritual liberty 
and liberates human reason – the christiana et libera ratio, working 
in submission to the law of love (lex Christi) (WA, 4:646 (13)).24 
Loving God and one’s neighbour is not an a-nomian activity – it 
reflects normative content, firstly, by demanding that man fulfils his 
or her god-given calling in liberty in all stations of life; secondly, it 
entails free activity insofar as is not prohibited by the moral law. 
Therefore human beings have the fundamental right to accomplish 
their callings in all stations of life, subject to the moral law, in 
promoting the common good. 
The human person is the first, proper seat (or basis) of freedom, or, 
to put it differently: the supreme principle of rights is situated in 
personal freedom, being the governance with which we rule our 
actions in fulfilling our calling. Although we possess the freedom of 
choice, by means of which we can determine our actions in favour of 
or against the moral law, we act badly every time we make use of 
freedom of choice to determine actions in opposition to the moral 
law, and we act well every time we make use of it to determine them 
according to the moral law. This is what is called moral good and 
evil. Although we may have the physical ability to act, we do not 
necessarily have moral freedom, which is present only when our 
acts are in accordance with the limits defined by the moral law.  
Moral freedom, flowing from freedom of conscience, is that part of 
freedom which is not restricted by the moral law. Freedom in this 
sense is not only de facto freedom but also freedom de jure because 
in man’s moral freedom the notion of right begins to appear. 
Properly speaking we cannot have a true right to perform action 
forbidden by the moral law, because what is wrong cannot be right. 
“Right” in this sense indicates something over and above what is 
simply lawful. It indicates not mere liberty of action, but a certain 
authority (or governance) to act, which (because it is moral) involves 
a relationship with other people. This relationship is formed by the 
moral law itself, which simultaneously grants freedom of action to a 
person and prohibits others from interfering with that action. 
Therefore, “right” may be defined as the moral governance to act, 
                                      
24 “[Ex plagis et vulneribus Christi fluit] lex rectae rationis.” 
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protected by the moral law which obliges others to respect that 
governance.  
Two comments need to be made regarding the social context of 
moral liberty: Firstly, moral freedom limits the power of civil govern-
ment to the extent that its power must be exercised in such a way 
that its enactments do not prevent any individual from using his 
means, faculties and powers necessary for attaining moral virtue (or 
moral contentment), without moral necessity. For example, the 
government’s obligation is to defend an equal right in all individuals 
by preventing a particular individual from using his right to obstruct 
an equal use of right in others. This is because government is the 
natural judge and defender of all these limits under the political 
equality of citizens before the law.  
Secondly, the members of the social body are all “ends”, in order to 
attain the good of virtue sought by means of human association. To 
this purpose society presupposes liberty. This social liberty expands 
and becomes perfect in the measure that social benevolence and 
justice expand with the diffusion of society. This liberty is the effect 
both by the justice possessed by society and by the virtue to which it 
tends.25
The first right involved in the fundamental right of free human 
personhood, is the right not to be harmed or injured in any faculty of 
human nature. Secondly, moral personhood draws a number of 
rights in its wake: the right to speak the truth, the right to judge ac-
tions in the light of truth and justice; to reprove moral evil; to enforce 
justice, and to re-establish justice by means of just punishment. 
Thirdly, the right to personal liberty as such presupposes that 
without sufficient moral motivation (in terms of the moral law) 
impingement on the liberty of a person would amount to moral evil. 
Fourthly, because right as such26 is rooted in the fundamental prin-
ciple of human personhood, any attempt to deprive human beings of 
truth, virtue and happiness would constitute an infringement of per-
sonal good. Fifthly, injury to personhood can be perpetrated not only 
                                      
25 Cf. John 8:31-32: “Then Jesus said to those Jews who believed Him, ‘If you 
abide in my word you are my disciples indeed. And you shall know the truth and 
the truth shall make you free.’” 
26 The fundamental principle of rights pertaining to personhood, flows from 
personal freedom – the right to act subject to the moral law. Because right is a 
faculty of free activity, personal freedom is the foremost principle of all rights. 
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by other human beings, but also by man himself. However, although 
such activity would amount to transgressing against the moral law, 
there will not be injury to right, because right is always relative to 
others having a duty not to intrude upon that right. Sixthly, the inter-
related rights of moral equality and moral liberty could together be 
formulated as the inalienable natural right (or privilege) to pursue 
and attain one’s moral and equitable end, virtue, and that grade of 
well-being appropriate to the social position of each. A second right 
could be added, namely the right to liberty of thought, inquiry and 
belief, subject to the moral law. 
2.2 Human dignity as the value of acting virtuously 
2.2.1 Human dignity as the value of attaining the supreme good 
An important context in which Cicero uses the concept of dignity is 
that of acting virtuously. Cicero uses the term dignitas to signify 
worthiness, merit or desert in an encompassing sense. In his Letters 
to his Friends (Fam., 11.17), Cicero alludes to the dignified way, or 
“utmost splendour” exhibited by the official Lamia in discharging the 
functions of aedile.27 Elsewhere Cicero also alludes to dignitas as 
the manifestation of worthy conduct or merit because of exceptional 
worthy behaviour (Pro Lege Agraria., 2.2.3).28 He also applies the 
term dignitas to signify merit or worthiness deserving praise.29 
Worthy conduct, to Cicero, is closely attached to justice and 
dignitas, for justice is a state of mind which preserves the common 
good by recognising the dignity of all men. By implication it is 
indicative of the harmony which the “human alliance” should achieve 
and, indeed, which is a prerequisite for the ideal state (cf. Inv., 2.55).  
In the patristic thought of St. Augustine, dignity is an important value 
in promoting the virtue of acting rationally. To St. Augustine only in 
the city of God the virtue of “everlasting dignity” can be attained 
(DCD, Bk. 3, Ch. 17).30 From the Scriptural perspective of Aquinas it 
appears that whatever is contained in the notion of dignitas must be 
                                      
27 “Is magnificentissimo munere aedilitatis perfunctus petit proeturam, omnesque 
intellegunt nec dignitatem ei desse nec gratiam.” 
28 “… sed dignitate impetratus esse videatur”. 
29 “Cum ab eo quaereretur, quid tandem accusaturus esset eum, quem pro 
dignitate ne laudere …” 
30 In the “true city” (of God) citizenship is an everlasting dignity. 
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attributed to God because creation is universally subject to God, and 
God has the governance of the whole universe in his hands. 
Therefore, all virtue must finally be attributed to divine intervention 
(Aquinas, P(1)-Q(22)-A(3)-O(1) ff.).   
To Luther, man’s highest good is not contained in his earthly 
existence but in God – the highest Good. Employing the Aristotelian 
doctrine of causes,31 Luther describes God as the causa efficiens et 
finalis mundi (WA, 40 (3) 209 (11) & 253 (11)).32 From Scripture and 
the Word of God man is able to gain knowledge of the efficient and 
final cause of the universe (LW, 1:124 ff. (LG); Genesis 2).33 Know-
ledge of the final and efficient cause is indispensible for acting 
virtuously, therefore Luther states that the greatest virtues are the 
fear of God and faith in Him. Secular philosophy has no knowledge 
of these and carries on a discussion solely about the material and 
the formal cause; it does not know the final cause which is pointed 
out by Scripture through faith (cf. LW, 2:126 n. 49 (LG); Gene-
sis 8).34  
                                      
31 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, Ch. 3. 
32 “[Solomon] docuit veram causam et principium, duterem et gubernationem 
Politiae et oeconomiae, scilicet Deum.” Also cf. WA (40 (1) 410 (11)): “Dicimus 
philosophiam moralem nihil scire de deo.” 
33 This means that true wisdom is contained only in Holy Scripture and the Word of 
God – this gives information not only about the matter of the entire creation, not 
only about its form, but also about the beginning and the end of all things, about 
who did the creating and for what purpose He created (LW, 1:127 ff. (LG); 
Genesis 2). Only the Word of God imparts true information about the two main 
causes, the effective and the final (cf. LW, 1:131 (LG); Genesis 2). 
34 To fear God and to trust in Him, says Luther, is more profitable than 
philosophical discussions about the material cause (LW, 2:149 (LG); Genesis 
9). Also cf. LW, 8:11 (LG); Genesis 4-5). Due to man’s fall into sin, he is blinded 
to the proper purpose or aim for which God ordained his creation. By doing 
God’s will the dignity of institutions and human acts are restored. Man is not at 
liberty to seek his own glory from the institutions ordained by God (cf. LW, 4:221 
(LG); Genesis 24). Luther alludes to the example of Laban’s resistance to the 
will of God, compared to the dignity God bestowed on Jacob, to compare the 
virtue of dignity with self-agrandisement. Compared to Jacob’s dignity Laban 
resisted the will of God through his idolatry, pride, greed, and contempt for his 
neighbour in seeking his own advantage (LW, 5:296 (LG); Genesis 29). With 
man’s creation the dignity of man consisted in the worth God bestowed on man. 
Luther does not materially differ from Bernard’s and Bonaventure’s view that the 
original dignity of man in the state of innocence was the direct reason for the 
devil’s fall into sin: because of his envy on account of which he begrudged men 
such great dignity, namely that God would become man, the devil saw that one 
day the divinity would descend and take upon itself “this wretched and mortal 
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In an evangelical context Luther deals with virtue as a “beauty” of 
those qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature, 
namely such as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise or 
blame; it is that value which renders any habit, disposition or 
exercise of the heart truly beautiful. Transposed into philosophical 
terms, true virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being 
in general, exercised in a general good will. Benevolence, therefore, 
is the term for virtue or moral beauty. The primary object of virtuous 
love is divine Being; a propensity and union of heart to Being; the 
love to God – the Being of beings – because throughout the whole 
universe, there is nothing in comparison with the divine Being. Are 
human beings able to practise benevolent virtue towards God? Yes; 
although we are not able to give anything to God, which we have of 
our own; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in 
which He takes a true and proper delight. Therefore God should be 
loved according to his dignity, namely the degree in which He has 
those things wherein worthiness of regard exists. Loving God 
according to his dignity entails the glorification of God; it is the final 
end of creation, because the glory of God is the last end for which 
He created the world; glorifying God means making known God’s 
perfections, his greatness and excellency. This is the thing God 
sought of the moral world, and the final aim of in human beings as 
the moral agents that He created; this is the essence of the value 
and proper fruit and end of man’s virtue.  
Secondly, it means that loving God’s creatures with a truly virtuous 
benevolence, amounts to glorifying God through his creatures, in 
whom God’s image and likeness shines forth. The virtuous love in 
created beings is dependent upon and derived from love to God. A 
truly virtuous mind, being under the sovereign dominion of love to 
God, seeks above all things the glory of God, and makes this his 
supreme, governing and ultimate goal.  
God bestows his gifts and blessings on man for the glorification of 
God and the welfare and benefit of the neighbour. Therefore the 
purpose of God’s gifts is not the pleasure or the tyranny of those 
who have the gifts, but their lawful use must be directed towards the 
glory of God and the welfare and the benefit of one’s neighbour.35 
                                                                                                              
flesh and would not take upon itself the nature of angels” (LW, 5:221 (LG); 
Genesis 28). 
35 In the world people receive God’s blessing, sovereignty, priesthood, power, 
strength, and intelligence, and although they have the efficient, formal and 
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The highest virtue of man consists in praising and glorifying God, 
who bestows them, and in seeing to the welfare of man’s neighbour 
(LW, 5:112 (LG); Genesis 27). Man’s virtuous acts in marriage and 
in the state are, therefore, a manifestation of man’s directedness at 
the final cause – God the Creator of these gifts (LW, 5:188 (LG); 
Genesis 28).36  
All human acts should, therefore, be evaluated by looking at their 
final cause or purpose. In marriage, for example, this is the pro-
creation of children, in government it is the preservation of peace. In 
a government the formal cause – that is the laws – may be wicked. 
The efficient cause – that is, a tyrant – may also be wicked. All hu-
man acts should be evaluated on the basis of the more powerful 
cause, namely the final cause. So it is in marriage. If the efficient 
cause – the married people themselves – is evil, and if the material 
is wicked, these wicked causes should be tolerated in order to save 
procreation, “this most beautiful and admirable work of God” (LW, 
12:350 (SP 1); Psalm 51).  
The most fundamental right pertaining to human beings is the right 
to attain the highest Good – to practise the virtue of attaining the 
supreme Good and to attain the highest virtue. If secular govern-
ment should make it impossible for its subjects to worship God as 
demanded by his Word and Scripture, this would be a serious 
impingement upon their dignity. If also, for example in the state, the 
tyrant acts contrary to the will of God and disregards the surpreme 
Good, and makes it impossible for his subjects to promote the 
welfare of their neighbours, this would not only be in conflict with 
God’s law, but would also amount to a disregard of man’s dignity.  
2.2.2 Human dignity as the value of social benevolence 
The supreme divine law for the attainment of justice in society is the 
twofold command of love contained in the precept to love your 
neighbour as yourself and the demand to treat your neighbour as 
                                                                                                              
material cause, they are not concerned about the final cause (LW, 5:112 (LG); 
Genesis 27). 
36 E.g. although marriage is sometimes defined as the union or companionship of 
man and woman, and the maintaining of inseparable companionship for life, this 
is not a true definition, for the final and the efficient causes are lacking. A 
definition directed at the final cause would read: “Marriage is the lawful and 
divine union of one man and one woman, ordained for the purpose of calling 
upon God, for the preservation and education of offspring, and for the 
administration of church and state” (LW, 5:188 (LG); Genesis 28). 
Koers 72(2) 2007:159-191  179 
Human personhood and social benevolence – reformational reflections ...  
you would like to be treated. This most profound commandment, 
says Luther, excludes every pretense of love. He who loves his 
neighbour on account of his money, honour, favour, power or com-
fort, and does not love the same person if he is poor, lowly, 
unlearned, hostile, dependent or unpleasant, has a hypocritical love, 
not a love for himself, but a love for his neighbour’s goods for his 
own benefit, and thus he does not love him “as himself,” even if he is 
a pauper, or a fool, “or a plain nothing” (LW, 25:474 ff. (LR); 
Romans 13).  
To Luther this commandment is the hardest of all, because no one 
wishes to be robbed, harmed, killed, to be the victim of adultery, to 
be lied to, victimised by perjury, or to have his property coveted. If 
he does not feel the same way about his neighbour, he is guilty of 
breaking this commandment (LW, 25:475 (LR); Romans 13). This 
commandment, to Luther, also includes the basic truth of Matthew 
7:12: “So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to 
them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.” He who thinks seriously 
about this commandment and applies it, ought not to depend on his 
own actions which are elicited from within but rather he must 
compare all the acts, words, and thoughts of his whole life with this 
commandment as a rule, and immediately “the contention, the 
detraction, the dissention will cease, and there will be present the 
whole host of virtues, every grace, every act of holiness, as it says 
here ‘the fulfilling of the Law’” (LW, 25:475 (LR); Romans 13). In 
Luther’s view the members of a society can accomplish the good of 
the society to which they belong by practising social benevolence:37 
the good of the society can only be attained by loving God above 
everything else and your neighbour as yourself. This implies that 
any person wishing the good of the social body, consequently 
wishes the good of all those forming the body of which he himself is 
one. Promoting the good and attaining justice reflects the work of 
the Holy Spirit in us. True human dignity means acting virtuously 
and by growing in sanctification, human beings become new crea-
tures in Christ. Sanctification according to the second table of Moses 
reflects the dignity of human beings in promoting the good and 
justice in society;38 thereby transforming society into the most noble 
love of moral virtue, and aims at every other good in relation to the 
supreme good. Social benevolence, so to speak, proceeds from a 
                                      
37 Cf. Raath (2006b:1-44). 
38 For Luther’s evangelical views on justice, cf. Raath (2006a:335-354). 
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“subjective” platform, generating “objective” virtues; thereby society 
increases qualitatively in dignity (moral virtue) as love, peace and 
justice, which form the end of society, are formed. A society reflect-
ing the dignity of justice (the best good and the condition and 
legitimate origin of every good) will therefore tend principally to love 
as the greatest source of every good. 
The kind of benevolence proper to the noblest of societies will be 
that by which each member of the society desires principally moral 
virtue (dignity) and moral perfection (sanctification). Moral excel-
lence is of the very essence of God and not of man. God is concrete 
goodness, infinite reason, knowledge and power, in a personal form; 
so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve 
obligation to God. To attain this aim, God’s law, as expressed in 
both the Decalogue and the precepts of natural law, forms the basis 
for attaining the highest good in society. In effect it implies that 
attaining the highest good in society is only possible by glorifying 
God and respecting the human being for what he is, as well as in 
promoting his dignity, namely the degree in which he has those 
things wherein worthiness of regard consists. “Worthiness of regard” 
is contained in all human beings and demands virtuous benevolence 
as reflected in the moral law. In this respect dignity is a wide concept 
which places on all men the moral requirement to treat man as a 
moral agent created in the image of God.39 Any conduct in conflict 
with the moral law will, therefore, reflect injury to dignity.  
Firstly, the right to freedom takes its origin in man’s liberty of con-
science.40 Therefore, liberty of conscience would constitute a con-
natural or fundamental right. Secondly, the connatural right to per-
sonal freedom is expressive of the right of all human beings to do all 
they wish with the morally good use of their powers and faculties in 
promoting moral virtue, unhindered by another’s caprice or wic-
kedness. Thirdly, the general right to personal freedom, translated 
into more specific rights, would encompass the right to speak and 
seek help; the right to corporal freedom; and the right to all morally 
good actions, including the right to acquire other rights to promote 
truth, virtue and happiness.  
                                      
39 This view comes close to the Calvinist perspectives of the Potchefstroom 
philosopher, H.G. Stoker (1970:36-37). 
40 Faith enlightens man’s conscience and reason cf. WA (40(1):204(5); 4:646 (13); 
Sermon of August 15, 1520). 
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3. Benevolence, moral value and the “broad and 
idealistic concept of dignity” in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of 
America 
In this section there will be focused on the benevolence, moral value 
and the “broad and idealistic concept of dignity” in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States of America. 
3.1 Benevolence, equality and liberty – the foundational 
rights in civil society 
The theologico-jural implications of Luther’s evangelical approach, 
which is commonly alluded to as human dignity, provide us with a 
twofold conception of fundamental rights (viz. the right to moral per-
sonhood and the right to moral virtue), correlative to the values and 
duties posited by the moral law. The value-duty-right correlation in 
Luther’s theologico-jural perspectives on the functioning and pro-
motion of the ius commune Christianorum in man’s social life, is not 
limited to man’s ecclesiastical life only.41 In his comments on the 
Peasant’s War, Luther pleads for the application of the principles of 
the ius commune Christianorum to man’s civil and political life (cf. 
Meurer, 1852:367 ff.). The common denominator to both the king-
dom of God and the kingdom of the world is the justice underlying all 
laws and rights and protecting the values enabling man to live a 
virtuous life.  
Christian evangelicals have the specific duty to promote an under-
standing and realisation of moral-jural obligations and rights in civil 
society. The implications of the ius commune Christianorum for 
man’s social life in civil society is far-reaching: through faith man 
experiences an understanding of love, equality and liberty. The right 
to social benevolence (love in social relations), is of divine origin and 
is not a humanly fabricated mechanism (cf. WA, 8:613(9),42 
                                      
41 The implications of the ius commune Christianorum for man’s social life in the 
civil sphere is far-reaching: through faith man experiences the true right to love, 
to equality and to liberty. The right to social benevolence (love in social 
relationships), is of divine origin (WA, 8:613 (9)). In WA (8:614 (1)), Luther 
observes: “Neque enim minus peccatum.” 
42 “Ex quibus verbis habes, nihil liere ulli docere, quod sit adversus Evangelicam 
libertatem.” 
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8:614(1),43 and 8:330(3)). The most basic value in the ius commune 
Christianorum is social benevolence, diversely intertwined with 
equality and liberty.44 Therefore, neighbourly love, to Luther, is the 
most basic fundamental right and should govern all external 
relationships between persons (WA Br., 1:397(44).45
3.2 The implications of the Lutheran-evangelical perspectives 
on fundamental rights and moral obligations 
What are the implications of applying the Lutheran-evangelical 
perspectives of the right to human dignity to man’s life in civil 
society? Firstly, the necessity and immutability of the idea of being 
embedded in Luther’s theologico-jural views provide morality with its 
undeniable sense of obligation – an appreciation of man’s role and 
position in the creational order of being, reflects man’s obligations 
towards the Supreme Being and being in general. Attributing to man 
what is proper to the moral law produces views of human autonomy; 
whilst the properties of man attributed to the moral law, lead to moral 
relativism, historicism and positivism. In order to conform to the 
moral law, man must acknowledge the status, role and value of 
created being, not insofar as they serve the pleasure of the moral 
subject, but insofar as they take their place in the creational order of 
being. The Supreme Good, undergirding the first table of the moral 
law, is attained by appreciating the creational order of being and 
taking one’s place in the creational order. Submitting oneself to the 
                                      
43 “Neque enim minus peccatum est, violare libertatem divinitus statutam, quam in 
quodvis dei praeceptum peccare.” 
44 Johannes Heckel points out that the secular views on rights are diametrically 
opposed to the rights based on faith in Christ: “Im Vergleich mit ihnen (die drei 
göttliche Grundrechte) sind die Grundrechte in weltlichen Herrschaften bloss 
verzerrte Schattenbilder. Schon die Umkehr der Reihenfolge ‘Bruderliebe, 
Gleichheit, Freiheit’ in ‘Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit’ zeigt den Gegensatz 
zwischen der geistlichen und weltlichen Auffassung über den Sinn des 
Gemeinschaftslebens an” (Heckel, 1973:48). Elsewhere Heckel states that 
“(d)ie christliche Bruderliebe ist das erste und in Rang wichtigste Grundrecht 
des äusseren Gemeinlebens der Christen untereinander. Sie greift im Dienst 
des Nächsten und besonders der Mitchristen überall zu, wo es andere zunächst 
von Gott Berufene fehlen lassen” (Heckel, 1973:209). Both equality and liberty 
are subject to neighbourly love (cf. WA, 5:403(29); WA, 19:72(23); WA Br., 6: 
27(10): “… die lieb soll uber alles gehn und den forgang haben, ausgenomen 
Gott, der uber alles, auch uber die liebe ist”); WA Br. (4:241(4) & (19)): “Nihil est 
itaque charitatem iactare, ut libertatem laedas, nam si hoc licebit charitati in 
libertatem, licebit idem in totum evangelion, quod etaim quareunt tyranni.” 
45 “Charitate omnes lex debet cedere, etiam orandi et sacrificandi.” 
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demands of the moral law provides one with the appreciation and 
recognition of other persons as being equal and free moral persons 
as oneself, and therefore worthy of the same respect as other moral 
subjects. If, therefore, a person invades my duty to worship God and 
glorify “being” for what it is, my status and value as a moral person 
(person subject to the moral law), free and equal in my social 
relationships towards other moral subjects, my human dignity, is 
invaded and both my duty of and right to justice as the supreme 
value of moral personhood is harmed. In particular the personal 
values contained in the moral law, which translates the realisation of 
“being” into social action, and which demand that every person is to 
be treated as a moral subject (or end) and not as a moral object (or 
means), are infringed.  
The value of sexual integrity provides one aspect of value protected 
by the moral law. The facts of the case of Boxer v Harris (437 F.3d 
1107 (11th Cir. 2006), reflect the sad story of Boxer, a male prison 
inmate, forced by Harris, a female prison guard, to perform three 
incidents of self-inflicted masturbation when he felt “forced to 
comply” and two incidents wherein the guard filed false disciplinary 
reports against him when he refused to follow her orders in this 
regard. In an appeal to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia, the majority of the court in appeal from 
the federal appellate court, in the form of a panel of three judges, 
turned down an application of rehearing en banc. The panel held 
that the abuse allegedly suffered by Boxer was not a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, insofar as forced masturbation represents only 
“a de minimis harm”, and that he only suffered a “little” sexual 
abuse, not constituting “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain” as demanded for constituting “cruel and unusual punishment 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment” (cf. Whitley v Albers 475 U.S. 
312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 54 USLW 4236). Neither, 
according to the panel, did the forced masturbation constitute 
wrongdoing “objectively ‘harmful enough’” to establish a constitu-
tional violation (referring to Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 
S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 60 USLW 4151).  
In a dissenting judgment, Barkett CJ held that to consider forced 
masturbation at the whim of a jailer, not “repugnant to the con-
science of mankind” and therefore permissible, would be to deny the 
“broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, human-
ity, and decency” that are embodied in the Eighth Amendment 
(according to the judgment in Estelle V Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 
S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 251) (quoting Jackson V Bishop, 404 F.2d 
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571). To Barkett CJ the test for measuring harm, for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes, is the extent to which a prisoner’s alleged harm 
violates human dignity and contemporary standards of decency. 
Barkett CJ held that the main thrust of Boxer’s complaint concerned 
a violation of human dignity, and that the Supreme Court had 
explained that sexuality is central to human dignity “and even to the 
very meaning of human existence”. For purposes of his judgment he 
relied on the judgment in the case of Laurence v Texas (539 U.S. 
558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 71 USLW 4574, 03 Cal. Daily 
Op. Serv. 5559, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7036, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 
Fed. S 427), where it was stated that laws regulating private sexual 
acts between consenting adults implicate “their dignity as free 
persons”, and the view expressed in the case of Planned Parent-
hood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey (505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 
2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674, 60 USLW 4795), to the effect that “personal 
decisions” relating to the matters involving sexuality are “central to 
personal dignity”.  
Barkett CJ consequently held that forced masturbation, constituting 
sexual abuse, undeniably violates a most basic aspect of human 
dignity; that the sex of the prison guard is just one among many 
factors that might contribute to the loss of human dignity expe-
rienced by a prisoner who suffers from the abuse, and that neither 
contemporary standards of decency nor basic principles of human 
dignity sanction compelled masturbation. By denying en banc 
review, the court ignored “the virtually unflagging obligation of the 
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them” where an 
important constitutional right is at stake (according to Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 
1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483, 9 ERC 1016).  
The dissenting judgment of Barkett CJ comes much closer to being 
sensitive to the nature, value and status of sexual integrity as a 
value pertaing to man’s dignity, than is the case in the majority judg-
ment. Firstly, Boxer’s moral status as a human being and his 
treatment as a moral object (or means) for the self-gratification of 
Harris is not adequately appreciated. Secondly, Harris’s invasion of 
Boxer’s duty to shun moral evil and aspire to moral virtue adds to 
the gravity of Harris’s negation of Boxer’s dignity as a moral person.  
Furthermore, the innate dignity conferred on human beings by their 
very existence as moral beings becomes an absolute inviolable right 
to be recognised wherever it is found. In the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the United States of America, the moral value of physical 
integrity has come under much consideration within the context of 
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the Eighth Amendment right not to be subject to cruel and unusual 
punishment and the corollary measure in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process clause, regarding the right to liberty, containing 
the right to be secure in one’s person. In the case of Meredith v 
State of Arizona (523 F.2d 481), a prisoner with a medical history of 
emphysema, was struck without justification in the solar plexus by a 
prison official, rendering him “totally handicapped”, as a result 
whereof he was given four hours of oxygen therapy “to counteract 
the damage that had been done.” It was held that the facts brought 
Meredith within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), 
which provides that every person who, “under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress”. The judgment of the 
court held that the right violated by an assault and battery is “the 
right to be secure in one’s person, and is grounded in the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”, which is an aspect 
of the right to liberty (with reference to Gregory v Thompson, 500 
F.2d 59), and relying on the case of Rochin v California (342 U.S. 
833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674, 60 USLW 4795), where it 
was held that assault and battery in that case, “shocks the 
conscience” (342 U.S. at 172), it was a conduct which involves force 
that is “brutal” and “offensive to human dignity” (342 U.S. at 174). 
The court held that the prison official’s conduct towards Meredith 
could be characterised as intentional, unjustified, brutal, “and offen-
sive to human dignity”. Firstly, the requirement that physical force 
must be “brutal” and “shocking to the conscience”, sets the require-
ment for invasion of a person’s dignity too high. Although the court in 
this case admitted that the attack on the victim’s person constituted 
a violation of human dignity, the violation of a prisoner’s physical 
integrity was not accepted in the case of Schy. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schy v State of Vermont 
(2 Fed.Appx. 101 C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2001), found that the plaintiff, who 
was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, to a chain attached 
to a wall for longer than two hours, did not provide sufficient facts as 
a matter of law  to suggest that the handcuffing was either brutal and 
offensive to human dignity, or unreasonable and that the plaintiff’s 
contentions were without merit. 
Thirdly, the essence of the right to human dignity is the freedom to 
act by moral agents, protected by the moral law which demands re-
186   Koers 72(2) 2007:159-191 
Andries Raath 
spect for this liberty from others. Therefore, the treatment of persons 
as moral objects mostly constitutes an infringement of moral liberty. 
The facts in the case of Felix illustrate the subjection of another 
person for one’s self-gratification and the ensuing infringement of 
moral liberty (liberty subject to the moral law). The Judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Felix v 
McCarthy (939  F.2d 699 Jul 10, 1991), underscores the lack of 
appreciation of the moral context of human dignity and the resulting 
imprecise and vaguely defined content of the right pertaining to 
human dignity. In this instance Felix, an inmate at San Quentin, 
brought a civil rights action against prison guards for using exces-
sive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights under 
the Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment. Felix, without any lawful reason, was hand-
cuffed by a prison officer and thrown against a wall, as a result of 
which he suffered “bruises, soreness, and emotional distress”. Can-
by JR, relying on the case of Meredith (523 F. 2d at 484), held that 
“it is not the degree of injury which makes out a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, but rather it is the use of official force or 
authority, that is “intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to hu-
man dignity”.  
Fourthly, the moral context of human rights demands an appre-
ciation of justice for what it is. Justice is the highest truth in civil 
society and constitutes the root and essence of all morality from the 
appreciation of “being” for what it is. Man’s obligation to be just 
ensures for him the right to act within the limits of justice. His duty to 
act in accordance with justice imposes on others the duty to respect 
this obligation. This duty-right-correlation implies that there can be 
no right in one person without a corresponding duty in others to 
respect that right. My duty, for example, to worship God gives rise to 
my right to worship God, a right which others have a duty to respect. 
Because duty is anterior to right, under the moral law, it does not 
necessarily give rise to rights in others. For example, my duty to 
worship God does not necessarily imply that other’s rights are 
violated if I do not worship God as I should.  
Fifthly, the maintaining, enforcing and application of the fundamental 
right to human dignity demand a serious engagement with and 
understanding of moral evil. The essential, connatural individual 
right to moral personhood and the rights pertaining to the activity of 
moral personhood, are rights embodied in the moral law and as 
such every infraction of which is itself moral evil.  
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Sixthly, the fundamental rights correlative to the values commonly 
associated with the obligations for protecting and promoting the 
“dignity” of man in society constitute two broad categories: The first 
basic category of rights in terms of human dignity is that of moral 
personhood. This “cluster of rights” includes the right to be treated 
as a moral subject and never as a moral object; the right to be 
treated morally equal, and thirdly, the right to be treated as a free 
moral person. The second category of rights is that of acting vir-
tuously. This category includes the right to attain the Supreme 
Good, and the right to social benevolence. Social benevolence 
tends towards promoting moral virtue in society. The values en-
shrined in the moral law posit the duties of men as the counterparts 
of men’s rights to attain the highest Good and to act virtuously 
towards their fellow men. Because these values also provide the 
basis for justice in society, “dignity”, as the value of moral virtue, is 
the moral basis for man’s human rights. Social benevolence is 
based on equality: through faith in Christ all distinctions fall away; in 
similar fashion as Christ subjected Himself to his brothers, men 
should submit to one another – the one serving the other.  
Seventhly, concerning Christians in particular, there should be a 
commitment to promote the common faith in Christ, from which flows 
a communio iuris. All Christians should live according to the ius 
commune Christianorum – with only one status and rank, namely 
the status provided by positive divine law (or the moral law in a spi-
ritual sense). The benevolent liberty, exempting persons from the lex 
irae in subjection to the secular laws, cultivates the realisation that 
because they are followers of Christ, they are “free masters over 
everything and subject to no one”.46
Eighthly, fundamental rights divested from the moral context of 
human “being”, open the door to relativistic and positivistic applica-
tions of connatural right. The reluctance to treat human dignity as a 
substantive “cluster” of rights within the purview of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution is a 
typical example of an a-normative contextual treatment of human 
                                      
46 Luther often quoted 1 Corinthians 9:19. In his work De libertate christiana 
(1520), Luther formulated these principles as follows: “1) Ein Christenmensch ist 
ein freier Herr über alle Dinge uns Niemand unterthan; 2) ein Christenmensch 
ist ein dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge uns Jedermann unterthan.” Alluding to 
Romans 13:8, Luther states: “Ich bin frei in allen Dingen und habe mich eines 
Jedermann Knecht gemacht” and “Ihr sollt Niemand etwas verplichtet sein, denn 
dass ihr euch unter einander lieb habt” (cf. Meurer, 1852:198-199). 
188   Koers 72(2) 2007:159-191 
Andries Raath 
dignity which, together with the disregard of moral evil within the 
Constitutional context, tends to reduce the fundamental right to 
dignity to mere cliché in constitutional jurisprudence. 
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